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PILOTS DENIED RELIEF-BY NARROWLY CONSTRUING
"PREVAILING PARTIES" UNDER THE EAJA, THE D.C.
CIRCUIT ALLOWS THE FAA TO RUN AMOK
ScoTr LARS ROGERS*
IN TURNER v. National Transportation Safety Board, the D.C. Cir-
cuit held that pilots were not "prevailing parties" when the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) withdrew a license-sus-
pension complaint against two pilots before their appeal to an
administrative law judge (ALJ).1 This strict application of "pre-
vailing party" denied the pilots relief under the Equal Access to
Justice Act (EAJA).2 The court defined "prevailing party" as a
party that receives any judicial relief.3 In holding that the pilots
were not prevailing parties, the court claimed that because the
FAA withdrew its complaint, the parties were no longer adversa-
ries, and the pilots and the FAA were left "where they were
before the complaint was filed."4 The D.C. Circuit's holding is
inequitable because the pilots were left worse off than they were
prior to the FAA's suspension action. The EAJA was available to
shift fees and make the pilots whole, but the D.C. Circuit incor-
rectly denied recovery to the pilots, leaving them without
remedy.'
The FAA suspended pilots Mark Turner and Stephen
Coonan's Airline Transport Pilot Certificates, alleging that the
pilots operated an aircraft that was not airworthy.6 Turner and
Coonan each appealed the suspension to an ALJ and were given
* J.D. Candidate, SMU Dedman School of Law, 2011; B.A., Southwestern
University, 2008. The author thanks his parents, Charles and Candace, for their
constant support and encouragement.
1 608 F.3d 12, 17 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
2 Id.
3 Id. at 15.
4 Id. at 16.
5 See 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) (1996) (relevant provision of the Equal Access to
Justice Act).
6 Turner, 608 F.3d at 13; 14 C.F.R. § 91.7(a) (2010) (stating that "No person
may operate a civil aircraft unless it is in an airworthy condition.").
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hearings in June 2008 until motions to continue pushed the
case back to August 2008.'
Shortly after the continuance of these cases, the FAA decided
to withdraw its license-suspension action against each pilot.8
The FAA gave only a brief statement regarding its withdrawal,
stating, "[t]he Administrator hereby withdraws its complaint in
this matter."9 As a result, the ALJ dismissed the proceedings
against the pilots and did not specify if the dismissal was with or
without prejudice.' 0
Turner and Coonan argued that they were "prevailing parties"
and sought recovery for attorney's fees and expenses under the
EAJA, which states:
An agency that conducts an adversary adjudication shall award,
to a prevailing party other than the United States, fees and other
expenses incurred by that party in connection with that proceed-
ing, unless the adjudicative officer of the agency finds that the
position of the agency was substantially justified or that special
circumstances make an award unjust.1'
The ALJ agreed with the pilots' position that they had prevailed
over the FAA and awarded the pilots attorney's fees and ex-
penses. 12 Specifically, the ALJ determined that due to the FAA's
withdrawal, its position was not "substantially justified," and with
this withdrawal the pilots prevailed. 13 The ALJ explained that
the FAA had "proceeded on a weak and tenuous basis with a
flawed investigation bereft of any meaningful evidence."' 4
After this unfavorable ruling, the FAA appealed to the Na-
tional Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), arguing that the
ALJ had erred in finding that Turner and Coonan were prevail-
ing parties. 5 Faced with an issue of first impression, the NTSB
relied on the civil action definition of "prevailing party" from
Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department
of Health and Human Resources. 6 The NTSB did not seize the
7 Turner, 608 F.3d at 13.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id. (the D.C. Circuit correctly interprets this unspecified dismissal by the ALJ
to be a dismissal without prejudice).
11 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) (1996).




16 Id.; see generally Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of
Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598 (2001).
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opportunity to actually define "prevailing party" in the context
of the instant case-agency adjudication.17 By relying on Buck-
hannon, the NTSB ignored the fundamental differences be-
tween civil action and agency adjudication. 18 The NTSB, relying
on Buckhannon, defined a prevailing party in agency cases as
someone who "receive [d] an enforceable judgment on the mer-
its of [his] case" or "obtain[ed] a court-ordered consent decree
that resulted in a change in the legal relationship between the
parties."19 Under this definition, the NTSB held that the pilots
failed to meet the prevailing party standard.20 The NTSB came
to this conclusion by finding that the pilots did not win on the
merits. Specifically, the ALJ did not "issue an order akin to a
court-supervised consent decree" because he "merely accepted"
the FAA withdrawal, and the ALJ's dismissal was without
prejudice, which left the relationship of the parties unaltered.2'
Turner and Coonan appealed to the D.C. Circuit, asking the
court to overrule the NTSB's decision to overturn the ALJ's or-
der granting attorney's fees and expenses. 22
The central issue facing the D.C. Circuit was whether the pi-
lots were prevailing parties.23 Relying on authority from the Su-
preme Court and the D.C. Circuit, the court defined "prevailing
parties" as parties that "receive only some form of judicial re-
lief."'24 Under this definition, the court found that the ALJ's dis-
missal was without prejudice and that the pilots received no
relief. Ultimately, the court held that the pilots were not prevail-
ing parties and upheld the NTSB's decision to deny the award of
attorney's fees and expenses.25
To answer the prevailing party question, the court first had to
decide the applicable definition of "prevailing party. '26 In re-
sponse to this challenge, the court relied on District of Columbia
17 Turner, 608 F.3d at 14.
18 See id.; Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 598.
19 Turner, 608 F.3d at 14.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 19.
23 Id. at 14.
24 Id. at 15.
25 Id. at 17.
26 See id. at 14-15; Contractor's Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Fed. Mine Safety &
Health Review Comm'n, 199 F.3d 1335, 1339 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (supporting the
proposition that a federal appellate court need not defer to an agency's interpre-
tation of a generally applicable statute).
2011]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AMD COMMERCE
v. Straus.27 The Straus court described a three-part test for "pre-
vailing," distilled from Buckhannon: "(1) there must be a 'court
ordered change in the legal relationship' of the parties; (2) the
judgment must be in favor of the party seeking the fees; and (3)
the judicial pronouncement must be accompanied by judicial
relief. '2' The court in Turner further simplified this test to say
that "prevailing" means "a party need receive only some form of
judicial relief, not necessarily a court-ordered consent decree or
a judgment on the merits. '29 With this simplified definition of
"prevailing party," the court greatly expanded the definition
that the NTSB had provided. 0 The NTSB held that a party can
only prevail if he receives "an enforceable judgment on the mer-
its of [his] case" or "a court-ordered consent decree that re-
sulted in a change in the legal relationship between the
parties."'3 ' However, even with the NTSB's much narrower defi-
nition, all members of the Board did not agree-in a dissent
one board member questioned the applicability of Buckhannon
because of factual differences. 2 In Buckhannon, the Supreme
Court rejected a claim for attorney's fees under a civil action
"catalyst theory, '33 while Turner involved defendants' claims for
relief in agency adjudication 4.3  The D.C. Circuit did rely on pre-
cedent to determine the more inclusive "prevailing party" defi-
nition. 5 In Carbonell v. INS, the Ninth Circuit described most
circuits as broadly defining "prevailing" when awarding attor-
ney's fees. 36 The court stated that "prevailing" had been broad-
ened to include, in the D.C. Circuit, rulings on judicial grounds
27 Turner, 608 F.3d at 15.
28 Id. (quoting District of Columbia v. Straus, 590 F.3d 898, 901 (D.C. Cir.
2010)); see also Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health &
Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 603-04, 607 (2001).
29 Turner, 608 F.3d at 15.
30 Id. at 14.
31 Id. at 15.
32 Id. at 14 (the NTSB dissent questioned the fact that Buckhannon addressed
fee shifting in a plaintiff's action while the Turner pilots were defendants against
the FAA).
33 See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 598 (stating that catalyst theory "posits that a
plaintiff is a 'prevailing party' if it achieves the desired result because the lawsuit
brought about a voluntary change in the defendant's conduct").
34 See Turner, 608 F.3d at 13-14.
35 See id. at 15.
36 See 429 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 2005).
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and grants of preliminary injunctions, and, in the Ninth Circuit,
even court orders with voluntary stipulations.3 7
The court applied its test of "some form of judicial relief' to
the facts surrounding the FAA's dismissal of its claims against
Turner and Coonan and found that "there was nothing in this
case analogous to judicial relief."' The court claimed that,
"[o]nce the FAA withdrew its complaints, the pilots were no
longer the subject of proceedings to suspend their licenses," fur-
ther reasoning that this withdrawal meant "the FAA had unilat-
erally ended the adversarial relationship between the parties,
leaving them where they were before the complaint was filed. 39
Since the ALJ was not needed to dismiss the FAA's complaint,
the dismissal was not a form of relief because the effect of the
ALJ dismissing the claim was the same as if the ALJ had taken no
action.4"
Finally, in addressing the first impression issue of the present
case, the Turner court decided the "prevailing party" test and
applied that test for the first time to a § 504(a) (1) claim.41 Pre-
viously, the D.C. Circuit had held Buckhannon generally applica-
ble to EAJA cases, but had only dealt with civil actions, while the
case at hand is an "agency adjudication. '42 The court admitted,
"we have never specifically held Buckhannon defines 'prevailing
party' as it is used in Section 504(a) (1)."4" In failing to layout a
much needed definition of "prevailing party" for agency adjudi-
cation claims, the court hid behind the fact that the pilots did
not raise the issue of the differences between civil action and
agency adjudication, and said that the Buckhannon definition
that is adopted in the present case does not necessarily apply to
future agency adjudication.4 4
37 See District of Columbia v. Jeppsen, 514 F.3d 1287, 1290 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
(jurisdictional grounds ruling can create a prevailing party); Carbonell, 429 F.3d at
895-96 (a court order with a voluntary stipulation can create a prevailing party);
Select Milk Producers, Inc. v. Johanns, 400 F.3d 939, 945 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (a
preliminary injunction can create a prevailing party).
38 Turner, 608 F.3d at 15-16.
19 Id. at 16.
40 Id.; see 49 C.F.R. § 821.12(b) (2010) (stating that a complaint can be with-
drawn without the approval of an ALJ).
41 Turner, 608 F.3d at 15 n.***; see Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W.
Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 600 (2001).
42 Turner, 608 F.3d at 15 n.***; see e.g., Consol. Edison Co. v. Bodman, 445 F.3d
438, 447 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
43 Turner, 608 F.3d at 15 n.***.
44 Id.
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The D.C. Circuit's analysis in Turner begins on the right track
by implementing a broad definition of "prevailing party. 45
Before Turner arrived at the D.C. Circuit, the NTSB tried to in-
terpret existing case law to narrowly define "prevailing party,"
but rendered a weak opinion, with one of its three members
dissenting. 6 By narrowly defining "prevailing party" as receiv-
ing an enforceable judgment or a court order that changed the
relationship of the parties, the NTSB easily held that Turner
and Coonan did not fall within its strict classification; the
NTSB's definition, and not its application, resulted in its ruling
in favor of the FAA.47 When Turner reached the D.C. Circuit,
the court was able to derive a test from Buckhannon and modify
that test using federal appellate court precedent to widen the
definition of "prevailing party."'48
Still, the D.C. Circuit court should have been more precise in
its definition. The court claimed the authority to define "pre-
vailing party," distinguished a Supreme Court holding, and fol-
lowed federal circuit precedent, but did not truly seize the
opportunity to offer a clear definition of "prevailing party" and
set a much needed precedent.4 9 Instead, the court weakly ad-
mitted, "we proceed upon that premise and do not determine
whether the understanding of 'prevailing party' . . . necessarily
or always applies to that phrase in § 504(a) (1)."5o The Turner
court was right to broaden the definition of prevailing party so
that pilots could receive relief when the FAA unilaterally termi-
nates an action, but it should have carefully established a defini-
tion that would apply to future cases regarding defendants in
EAJA agency adjudication claims. Despite its feigned attempt to
limit its application,5 1 the court should have realized that its
holding would have far-reaching implications for FAA litigation.
Under the broad definition of "prevailing party," the court's
analysis should differ from the NTSB's analysis, which uses a
narrow definition.
Though the D.C. Circuit correctly broadened the definition
of "prevailing," its analysis under that definition fails to per-
suade. The court misapplied its definition of "prevailing party"
45 See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
46 Turner, 608 F.3d at 14.
47 See id.
- See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
49 See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
50 Turner, 608 F.3d at 15 n.***.
51 Id. at 17.
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and incorrectly blocked the pilots from collecting their remedy
of attorney's fees. First, the court claimed that the pilots did not
prevail since the FAA's claim against them was dismissed without
prejudice.52 Under the Turner court's definition of prevailing as
"only some form of judicial relief," the court could have found
that the FAA's dismissal did provide the pilots relief-the relief
of a dismissal, which is akin to a ruling on judicial grounds with-
out judgment on the merits or a preliminary injunction.53
Under the court's broad definition of prevailing party, the court
should not simply regard a dismissal as a non-remedy when this
is the exact relief that the pilots sought.54
A second element of the court's analysis is flawed. The court
mistakenly reasoned that the pilots were left "where they were
before the complaint was filed. 55 This reasoning is not persua-
sive; looking at the relevant statute, the EAJA was conceived for
the very reason that a party who succeeded in an adversary adju-
dication could be made whole by an award of incurred fees and
expenses, unless the agency was "substantially justified" in its
claim.56 Here, the ALJ clearly held that "far from being 'sub-
stantiallyjustified,' the FAA had 'proceeded on a weak and tenu-
ous basis with a flawed investigation bereft of any meaningful
evidence.' "-17 However, the court ignored the fact that the pilots
were necessarily worse off by initially having their pilots' certifi-
cates taken and then having to defend themselves from the
FAA's unwarranted accusations. Rather thar simply trying to
reason that because the charges were dismissed the pilots were
left in the same position, the Turner court should apply its
broader definition of "prevailing" to the facts at hand to under-
stand that the pilots have prevailed in the FAA's withdrawal, and
that, in line with the purpose of § 504(a) (1), the pilots should
be made whole through an award of attorney's fees.
Moreover, the potential future ramifications of the court's
holding in Turner are alarming. The court's reasoning gives an
advantage to the FAA in its dealings with pilots-the FAA can
simply withdraw an ALJ appeal in order to avoid EAJA repercus-
sions. Without the check of EAJA fee awards to successful de-
fendants, pilots are left without a defense to FAA actions that
52 See id. at 16.
53 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
54 Turner, 608 F.3d at 14, 15.
55 Id. at 16.
56 See5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) (1996).
57 Turner, 608 F.3d at 14 (quoting the ALJ's holding).
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may be "weak and tenuous" or "without substantial
justification."58
In conclusion, the D.C. Circuit's definition of "prevailing
party" was correct, but it failed to correctly apply its broad defi-
nition to its analysis of the facts. Although the court attempted
to limit its definition and analysis of "prevailing party," it is likely
that Turner can be relied on by the FAA to defend against awards
of fees and other expenses to pilots that prevail in their defense
of frivolous FAA actions. The D.C. Circuit should make a clear
decision in the future that respects the substance of the EAJA
and protects pilots from intrusive FAA action by knowingly de-
fining and carefully analyzing the "prevailing party" so that a
larger class of successful pilot defendants can recover fees and
expenses when justified.
58 See id.
